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MIGRATORY DIVORCE: A PROPOSED
CONGRESSIONAL REMEDY
ANDREW A. CAFFREYt
On June 7, 1948, in the Sherrer case' the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, once again con-
sidered the perplexing question, when must one state give effect
to a decree of divorce rendered by courts of a sister state; and its
latest answer to that question is, in the words of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who voiced a dissent in which the late Mr. Justice
Murphy concurred, ". . . calculated, however unwittingly, to
promote perjury without otherwise appreciably affecting the
existing disharmonies among the forty-eight states in relation
to divorce."2
It is the thesis of this paper that a review of the procession
of cases in which the Supreme Court has unsuccessfully grappled
with the problems posed by "inter-state" divorce, dating back to
Cheever v. Wilson,3 decided in 1869, and continuing up to the
present decision, make manifest the inadequacy of the judiciary
as the agency for resolving these problems. It is this inadequacy
of the judiciary's solution which suggests that in definitive legis-
lation may be found a more adequate instrumentality for the
elimination of many of the existing uncertainties, conflicts, and
difficulties in the administration of divorce laws. The inability
of the Court to satisfactorily deal with this problem is articulated
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the first
Williams case, where he says:
... these complications cannot be removed by any decisions
this Court can make-neither the crudest nor the subtlestjuggling of legal concepts could enable us to bring forth a
uniform national law of marriage and divorce.... Judicial
attempts to solve problems that are intrinsically legislative
... are apt to be as futile in their achievement as they are
presumptuous in their undertaking.4
Before the feasibility of legislation on the subject is considered,
the leading cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt with the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
2. Id. at 356.
3. 9 Wall. 108 (U.S. 1869).
4. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
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problem of mandatory recognition by one state of a divorce de-
cree rendered in another of the United States, under compulsion
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, will be briefly reviewed to
trace the development of the law as it is today, and to define more
sharply the problem for which a legislative solution is sought.
The very limited problem whether an alimony decree of the
courts of State A, issued as an incident to a divorce a mens or a
judicial separation decreed by the State A court, survives, when
one of the parties subsequently secures an absolute divorce in
State B, a problem which dates back to Barber v. Barber, decided
in 1858, and was once again before the Supreme Court in Estin
,v. Estin,6 will not be considered herein.
I
The Court first considered the effect in other of the United
States of an absolute divorce, which is valid and effective by the
laws of the state in which it was obtained, in Cheever v. Wilson,7
where reliance was placed upon Article IV, Section I of the Con-
stitution.8 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne,
said:
If a judgment is conclusive in a State where it is rendered,
it is equally conclusive everywhere in the courts of the
United States.
... The only question [before us] is as to the reality of her
new residence and of the change of domicil.... The finding
[of a new domicil in Indiana for the wife] is clearly sufficient
until overcome by adverse testimony...
It is insisted.., that the domicil of the husband is the wife's;
and that she cannot have a different one from his. The con-
verse of the latter proposition is so well settled that it would
be idle to discuss it. The rule is that she may acquire a
separate domicil whenever it is necessary or proper that she
should do so. The right springs from the necessity for its
exercise, and endures as long as the necessity continues.
The proceeding for a divorce may be instituted where the
wife has her domicil.9
5. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1859).
6. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
7. 9 Wall. 108 (U.S. 1869).
8. U.S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.
9. 9 Wall. 108, 123 (U.S. 1869).
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It is noteworthy that although the opinion creates the impres-
sion that domicil of the wife in Indiana was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction to divorce the parties on the Indiana court, never-
theless Mr. Cheever not only personally appeared, but filed a
cross bill, and was granted custody of the three eldest children.
Moreover, the wife was ordered to pay him for the support of
these children from the income of certain realty, to the rents
from which she was entitled under the terms of a marriage settle-
ment. Although the Court did not develop the point, it may also
have been significant that Wilson, who tried to upset the validity
of the Indiana divorce, claimed the right to the income from the
realty as lessee thereof from the wife, who was the libellant in
the Indiana divorce proceeding. The case adds two elements to
the newly developing law on inter-state divorce decree recog-
nition: first, that a divorce valid and conclusive in State A, where
rendered, is equally valid and conclusive in all the other states;
and secondly, contrary to the then prevailing English rule, a wife
may obtain a domicil separate from that of her husband, at least
when she is living apart from her husband for a sufficient cause.
This second point leaves us with two questions: (a) what, for
purposes of this rule, is a sufficient cause; and (b) by what law
will the forum decide the sufficiency of a cause of living apart
by the wife?
Fifteen years later in Cheeley v. Clayton,0 Mr. Justice Gray,
after citing the Cheever case as authority for the proposition
that the domiciliary state of one of the parties, if that party is
living apart for sufficient cause, may divorce them by a decree
which will be valid everywhere, added a new precaution, saying:
But in order to make the divorce valid either in the state in
which it is granted or in another state, there must, unless
the defendant appeared in the suit, have been such notice to
her as the law of the first state required."
The next significant"2 Supreme Court decision on the question
was the Atherton case,'13 decided in 1901. Here the Court evi-
dences a growing awareness that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has made it the unwilling arbiter between conflicting
10. 110 U.S. 701 (1884).
11. Id. at 705.
12. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) was the next case chronologi-
cally but adds nothing of significance to the development of the law on
divorce decree recognition.
13. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
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state views and laws. The Court's spokesman, Mr. Justice Gray,
places the decision on an interpretation of the mandate of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. He traces the leading cases from
Maine,-4 Rhode Island, 5 Massachusetts, 6 and New Jersey" to
support the rule that domicil of one of the spouses suffices to
confer jurisdiction upon the courts of that domicil to validly
divorce both the spouses, and then looks at the reasoning of the
leading New York case" urging the contrary view. Proceeding
cautiously, Mr. Justice Gray said:
The authorities above cited show the wide diversity of
opinion existing upon this important subject, and admonish
us to confine our decision to the exact case before us.... In
this case, the divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the
state which had always been the undoubted domicil of the
husband, and which was the only matrimonial domicil of the
husband and wife. The single question to be decided is the
validity of that divorce granted after such notice had been
given as was required by the statutes of Kentucky. 9
Prior to having thus carefully limited the scope of the decision,
Mr. Justice Gray had said:
the purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without
a husband is unknown to the law ... The rule as to the
notice necessary to give full effect to a decree of divorce is
different from that which is required in suits in personam.20
The Court cites a lengthy dictum from Pennoyer v. Neff as
buttressing this statement on the requirement of notice. The
pertinent portion states:
The jurisdiction which every state possesses to determine
the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves
authority to prescribe the conditions on which the proceed-
ings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within
its territory. The state.., has absolute right to prescribe
the conditions for which the marriage relation between its
14. Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140 (Me. 1832).
15. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
16. Hood v. Hood, 11 Allen 196 (Mass. 1865).
17. Felt v. Felt, 59 N.J. Eq. 606 (1899).
18. People v. Baker, 76 N.Y. 78 (1879).
19. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 170 (1901).
20. Id. at 162.
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,own citizens... may be dissolved. One of the parties, guilty
of acts for which, by the law of the state, a dissolution may
be granted, may have removed to a state where no dissolu-
tion is permitted. The complaining party would therefore
fail if a divorce were sought in the state of the defendant;
and if application could not be made to the tribunals of the
complainant's domicil in such case, and proceedings be
there instituted without personal service of process or per-
sonal notice to the offending party, the injured citizen would
be without redress.2 1
After tracing the authorities cited above,22 Mr. Justice Gray
concluded:
We are of opinion that the ... decree of the court there,
granting a divorce upon the ground that she had abandoned
her husband, is as binding on her as if she had been served
with notice in Kentucky, or had voluntarily appeared in the
suit.2'
It is to be noted here that the Court deliberately leaves open
several questions which return to plague it in cases which we
shall consider later. These are principally the questions as to
the validity of a divorce where only constructive service is made
upon the absent and non-resident libellee, and also the more
vexatious question as to the extent to which the bona fides of
the domicil may be later inquired into by the courts of either the
same or a different jurisdiction. The Court here relied heavily
upon the fact that Kentucky was the only matrimonial domicil
the parties ever had. This reliance appears in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Gray and is more clearly apparent from the discus-
sion of the Atherton case in the subsequent cases of Haddock v.
Haddock24 and Thompson v. Thompson.25 This trend toward
attaching especial significance to the validity of the decree of
divorce of the state which, in addition to being the domicil of the
libellant, is also the matrimonial domicil of the parties reaches
its fruition in the celebrated case of Haddock v. Haddock,2 a
decision which perpetuated its own special type of confusion until
21. 95 U.S. 714 734 (1877). Mr. Justice Field, who was the Court's
spokesman in the Pennoyer case, relied on BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAw OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2d ed. 1852), a work frequently cited in
these earlier cases which lay the foundation of the present law. Its influence
in shaping the Court's views would seem to be not inconsiderable.
22. See notes 15-18, 20 supra.
23. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 172 (1901).
24. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
25. 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
26. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
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it was laid to rest in the first of the equally celebrated Williams
cases.
27
In the same year the Court decided the Bell28 and Streiwof20
cases. In the Bell case, Mr. Justice Gray was once again the
Court's spokesman, saying:
No valid divorce from the bond of matrimony can be decreed
on constructive service by the courts of a state in which
neither party is domiciled .... the court in Pennsylvania
had no jurisdiction of the husband's suit for divorce, because
neither party had a domicil in Pennsylvania, and the decree
of divorce was entitled to no faith and credit in New York
or in any other state.3 0
The Court here makes domicil of one of the parties a sine qua
non for jurisdiction to divorce on constructive service. The sub-
sequent cases, especially the Streitwolf case, where Mr. Justice
Gray followed Bell v. Bell explicitly, and the Andrews case1 and
the majority opinion in the second Williams case,'2 confirm the
view that it is in the Bell case that the Court expressly adopts
the English common law rule, laid down by the Privy Council in
Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier,33 that domicil is a jurisdictional
requisite for divorce. Even this case, which commentators and
courts universally cite for this premise, has been questioned
recently by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook.34 Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting in the second Williams case, protests that neither the
Bell nor Streitwolf cases turned on domicil, but that both turned
on a finding that the statutory residence requirements of the
divorcing states were not complied with.3 This difference of
opinion is here noted as illustrative of the fact that the judicial
development of this problem is rife with uncertainties at every
step of the way, and that the opinions of the Court have not been
framed in such a way as to foreclose such divergence of inter-
pretation by later courts.
The Streitwolf case will not be discussed here because it was
27. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
28. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
29. Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901).
30. 181 U.S. 175,177 (1901).
31. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
32. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
33. [1895] A.C. 517.
34. COOK, THE LoGIcAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT oF LAWS 458
et seq. (1942).
35. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 272 n. 11, 12 (1945).
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merely a companion case to Bell v. Bell and involved merely the
application of the rule of the Bell case.
Mr. Justice White was the Court's spokesman when it again
considered the problem in the Andrews case after a silence of
two years. That the problem's difficulty was now being realized
is evidenced by the fact that the Court split five-three, Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes, who had written the opinion below as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, not participat-
ing.16 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Massachu-
setts version of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act,3 7 saying:
As the state of Massachusetts had exclusive jurisdiction over
its citizens concerning the marriage tie and its dissolution,
and consequently the authority to prohibit them from per-
petrating a fraud upon the law of their domicil by tempo-
rarily sojourning in another state, and there, without ac-
quiring a bona fide domicil, procuring a decree of divorce, it
follows that the South Dakota decree relied upon was ren-
dered by a court without jurisdiction, and hence the due
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United
States did not require the enforcement of such decree in the
State of Massachusetts.
But it is said that . . . the case now under consideration
is taken out of the rule announced in Bell and Streitwolf,
since here the defendant appeared, and consequently became
subject to the jurisdiction of the court by which the decree
of divorce was rendered.
But it is obvious that the inadequacy of the appearance or
consent of one person to confer jurisdiction over a subject
matter not resting on consent includes, necessarily, the want
of power of both parties to endow the court with jurisdiction
over a subject matter, which appearance or consent could not
give... as the appearance of one or both of the parties to a
divorce proceeding could not suffice to confer jurisdiction
over the subject matter, where it was wanting because of
the absence of domicil within the state, we conclude that no
violation of the due faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion of the United States arose from the action of the su-
preme judicial court of Massachusetts in obeying the com-
mand of the state statute, and refusing to give effect to the
decree of divorce in question.38
36. Andrews v. Andrews, 176 Mass. 92 (1900).
37. MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 208, § 39 (1932).
38. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 37 (1903).
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Due to the rather "fuzzy" statement of facts in the opinion it
is difficult to determine what this decision adds, if anything, be-
yond the rule that the appearance of both parties is inadequate
to confer jurisdiction to divorce upon the courts of a state which
is not the domicil of at least one of the spouses. The finding was
that, although the husband "remained in South Dakota a period
of time longer than is necessary by the laws of said State to gain
a domicil there," he became a "resident" thereof but did not gain
a "domicil" therein. The statement just quoted was probably
intended to say that the husband remained in South Dakota long
enough to comply with the statutory requirement of ninety days'
residence next preceding the commencement of the action,"'
since it is elementary that there is no minimum time requirement
for presence in a state as a condition to acquiring domicil if the
fact of physical presence and the requisite intent are found" to
have combined. This ease of changing domicil is one of the points
relied upon in the dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge in the second
Williams case, where he says:
. . . 'home' in the domiciliary sense can be changed in the
twinlding of an eye, the time it takes a man to make up his
mind to remain where he is when he is away from home.41
A further fact which casts doubt on the scope of this decision
is the fact that, although the opinion is couched in terms of an
appearance and presumably full litigation by the defendant, in
fact, pursuant to a settlement between the parties, the defendant
asked for and obtained leave of court to withdraw her appearance
in the South Dakota action, her appearance having been made
through counsel and she herself never having been within the
state. That this withdrawal may have been significant is indi-
cated in Sherrer v. Sherrer where it is said in the majority
opinion,4 2 "On its facts the Andrews case presents variations
from the present situation." To this statement is appended a
note, "Thus in the Andrews case, before the divorce decree was
entered by the South Dakota court, the defendant withdrew her
appearance in accordance with a consent agreement. ' 43 The
39. S.D. CODE § 2578 (1939).
40. White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790 (1888).
41. 325 U.S. 226, 257 (1945).
42. 334 U.S. 343, 353 (1948).
43. Ibid.
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Court then at least partially overruled the Andrews case, using
rather elusive language in so doing. It said:
But insofar as the rule of that case may be said to be incon-
sistent with judgment herein announced, it must be regarded
as having been superseded by subsequent decision of this
court.
44
Although it is not our purpose at this point to examine the scope
of the Sherrer decision, the above passage reflects how the un-
certainty of the Andrews case is, in effect, multiplied by being
coupled with further loose language in the Sherrer case. An
additional uncertainty created by this opinion is that it does not
say which court will be the arbiter of the question of whether a
change in domicil has occurred. By implication it is suggested
that the state which is enforcing the Marriage Evasion Act, in
refusing to recognize a foreign divorce granted to one of its
citizens, may always decide for itself the question of domicil. The
reason for this rule would be that since domicil is universally
recognized in the United States as a jurisdictional prerequisite,
the foreign divorce-decreeing state will never make a finding
that a successful libellant is still domiciled in his former home
state. Such a proposition seems implicit in the decision, and
leaves open the question as to what effect, if any, flows from a
full litigation of that question in the foreign state where both
spouses appear, since this decision did not involve real litigation
of the question of domicil.
Three years later the famous Haddock case45 came before the
Court, launching an avalanche of comment, 46 most of which seems
to have been highly critical. Since the case was expressly over-
ruled by the first Williams case, a detailed analysis is not neces-
sary for our purposes; suffice it to briefly summarize the holding.
The court said:
The question is this: Is a proceeding for divorce of such an
exceptional character as not to come within the rule limiting
the authority of a state to persons within its jurisdiction,
but, on the contrary, because of the power which government
may exercise over the marriage relation, constitutes an ex-
ception to that rule....
.. the denial of the power to enforce in another state a de-
44. Ibid.
45. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
46. For leading articles, see STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
299, n. 61 (2d ed. 1951).
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cree of divorce rendered against a person who was not sub-ject to the jurisdiction of the state in which the decree was
rendered obviates all the contradictions and inconveniences
which are above indicated.... It does not deprive a state of
the power to render a decree of divorce susceptible of being
enforced within its borders as to persons within the jurisdic-
tion and does not debar other states from giving such effect
to a judgment of that character as they may elect to do under
mere principles of state comity....
Without questioning the power of the state of Connecticut to
enforce within its own borders a decree of divorce which is
here in issue, and without intimating a doubt as to the power
of the state of New York to give a decree of that character
within the borders of the state of New York and as to its
own citizens, such efficacy as it may be entitled to in view
of the public policy of that state, we hold that the decree of
the court of Connecticut rendered under the circumstances
stated was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the state
of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause. 47
Mr. Justice Douglas summarizes the effect of the decision as
follows:
... where one spouse is wrongfully deserted he retains power
over the matrimonial domicil so that the domicil of the other
spouse follows him wherever he may go, while if he is to
blame he retains no such power. ... Furthermore, the fault
or wrong of one spouse in leaving the other becomes under
that view a jurisdictional fact on which this Court would
ultimately have to pass. 48
For a period of twenty-two years no major migratory divorce
case came before the Court. However, Thompson v. Thompson40
applied the Haddock rule to a state decree of divorce a mensa and
in so doing disapproved a line of state court decisions which
reasoned that, since divorces a mensa worked no change in the
marital status, they could not be deemed to be in rem or quasi
in rem judgments, and hence for such divorces personal juris-
diction over both spouses was a jurisdictional requirement. The
Thompson case held that the court of a matrimonial domicil
which was also the domicil of the plaintiff could validly enter a
decree of divorce a mensa, though only constructive service is
had upon the non-resident defendant, and that such a decree is
entitled to full faith and credit.
47. 201 U.S. 562, 572, 581, 605, 606 (1906).
48. Speaking for a majority of the Court in overruling Haddock v.
Haddock, in Williams v. Williams, 317 U.S. 287, 300 (1942).
49. 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
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In so doing, the Court reaches a really startling result when
the nature of a divorce a mensa (i.e., judicial separation) is
considered. Such a decree has no effect on the marriage status
and is an order to the defendant to do or refrain from doing
certain acts with regard to the plaintiff. From the nature of such
a decree it would seem incontrovertible that personal jurisdiction
over the defendant was a prerequisite to procedural due process.
To sustain the validity of such a decree on merely constructive
service seems to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the settled
rule of Pennoyer v. Neff.
The Court also considered the divorce problem in Williamson
r. Osenton,30 although only in an incidental way, and decided that
since a wife may gain a separate domicil for purposes of divorce,
she may do likewise for other purposes. Mr. Justice Holmes's
opinion concludes:
We see no reason why the wife who justifiably has left her
husband should not have the same choice of domicil for an
action of damages that she has against her husband for a
divorce."
It is to be noted that this decision adds another jurisdictional
fact to diversity cases of this type, namely an inquiry into
whether the wife has justifiably left her husband.
The next important case was Davis v. Davis,52 which repre-
sented a new departure, in that it introduced the application of
res judicata into the divorce field with respect to the question of
the divorce-decreeing court's jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter." Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous court, said:
As to petitioner's domicil for divorce and his standing to in-
voke jurisdiction of the Virginia court, its finding that he
was a bona fide resident of that State for the required time
is binding upon respondent in the courts of the District.
She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for divorce
in the state court, for she appeared there and by plea put in
issue his allegation as to domicil, introduced evidence to show
it false, took exceptions to the commissioner's report, and
sought to have the court sustain them and uphold her plea.
... Considered in its entirety, the record shows that she sub-
50. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914).
51. Id. at 620.
52. 305 U.S. 32 (1908).
53. Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
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mitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court and
is bound by its determination that it had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties."
This decision did not seriously affect the rule of Haddock v.
Haddock, but, by introducing a new element upon which finality
might be rested, it did change the existing law to the extent that,
in rather loosely defined 5 circumstances, it denied an opportunity
for the second state to allow a relitigation of the "jurisdictional
fact" of domicil. It tended to shift the emphasis from reliance
upon the earlier cases in the divorce decree recognition field to a
reliance on decisions in the field of res judicata, especially Bald-
win v. Traveling Men's Association.6
It should be borne in mind that the cases in this latter field
were cases involving "private" litigants, chiefly disputing title
to land or commercial paper, and the state was not interested
in these cases, qua sovereign, as it is in the divorce cases, where
we now find the principle of res judicata in a new application.
This trend reached fuller fruition in the Sherrer case, as will
be seen.
Four years later the first 57 of the two highly controversial
Williams cases was decided, with Mr. Justice Douglas speaking
for six members of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankxfurter concur-
ring, and Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting
in separate opinions. Although an avalanche of critical com-
mentaries was occasioned thereby,58 the commentators at least
seem agreed on a few propositions: first, that the case went up
to the Supreme Court on a poor record which helped in the pro-
duction of an unsatisfactory opinion; second, that the case un-
equivocally and expressly overruled the Haddock case; third,
that the decision was made on the assumption that the truant
spouses had a bona fide domicil in Nevada. The portion of the
opinion pertinent for our purposes states:
•. divorce decrees are more than in personam judgments.
They involve the marital status of the parties. Domicil
creates a relationship to the state which is adequate for
54. 305 U.S. 32 40 (1938).
55. That the and Sherrer cases could find their respective ways to
the bar of the Supreme Court on the discretionary writ of certiorari is
telling evidence of the looseness with which the line of demarcation was
drawn in the Davis case.
56. 238 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
57. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
58. 2 NELSON, DivoRno AND ANNULMENT 466 (2d ed. 1945).
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numerous exercises of state power ... each state . . . can
alter within its own borders the marriage status of the
spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is ab-
sent. There is no constitutional barrier if the form and
nature of the substituted service meet the requirements of
due process.... It therefore follows that the Nevada decrees
were wholly effective to change in that state the marital
status of the petitioners and each of the other spouses by
the North Carolina marriages.... But the concession that
the decrees were effective in Nevada makes more compelling
the reasons for rejection of the theory and result of the
Haddock case .... So, when a court of one state alters the
marital status of one domiciled in that state by granting him
a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree
should be excepted from the full faith and credit clause
merely because its enforcement or recognition in another
state would conflict with the policy of the latter. 9
What the Court did here was first to consider the statement of
Chief Justice Marshall in Hampton v. M'Connel 0 that:
... the judgment of a state court should have the same credit,
validity, and effect, in every other court in the United States,
which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and that
whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state,
and none others, could be pleaded in any other court in the
United States.61
It then reflected that, although some exceptions have been en-
grafted judicially upon this rule, as Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed
out in Broderick v. Rosner,62 "... . the room left for the play of
conflicting policies is a narrow one." Then, upon a re-examina-
tion of the premises upon which the result of Haddock v. Haddock
was reached, the Court here decided that the exception to the
rule created by the Haddock case was not worthy of survival in a
federal union. In brief, if one of the spouses has a domicil in
State A, State B, wherein the other spouse is domiciled, may not
refuse full faith and credit to a divorce decree of State A. This
is true even though the spouse domiciled in State B never ap-
peared nor was served with process in State A, and though recog-
nition of such decree would strongly offend the policy of State B.
It must be assumed, of course, that State A's substituted service
met the minimum requirements of procedural due process. The
59. 317 U. S. 287, 298 (1942).
60. 3 Wheat. 234 (U.S. 1818).
61. Id. at 235.
62. 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935).
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Court, with its attention focused on the full faith and credit
aspects of the divorce problem, has to date failed to make clear
its position as to what constitutes procedural due process in the
divorce decree area.6 3
On remand the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on Bell
v. Bell and affirmed the convictions. Certiorari was granted to
review the claim that in so doing the North Carolina Supreme
Court denied full faith and credit to the Nevada decrees. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinion which reflects the utter
inability of the Court to agree on the problem. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion, putatively the majority opinion, was
shared only by Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Reed; the late
Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a separate concurring opinion, in
which he was joined by Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Jackson; Mr. Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion, in which
Mr. Justice Douglas, who spoke for the majority in the first
Williams case, joined; and the late Justice Rutledge wrote a
separate dissent. 4
In the first case the Court had assumed, arguendo, that peti-
tioners had a bona fide domicil in Nevada. No question was
raised there as to whether the North Carolina courts could
re-examine the existence of the petitioner's domicil in Nevada
and refuse to recognize the Nevada decree upon a finding of no
domicil. The problem now before the Court was to determine
the extent to which and the circumstances under which the North
Carolina courts could inquire into the validity of the finding of
a Nevada domicil by the Nevada courts. Said Mr. Justice Frank-
furter:
The record then before us did not present the question
whether North Carolina had power 'to refuse full faith and
credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to the
findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds that no
bona fide domicil was acquired in Nevada....' This is the
63. The fact situations are capable of endless juxtaposition where one,
both, or neither spouse was previously domiciled in the state in which the
libellant has now claimed a domicil and sued for divorce, relying upon the
local substituted-service statute. That the problem has not become more
acute to date would seem to be due to the fact that most states, in order to
ensure extra-territorial recognition for their decrees, have been fairly dili-
gent in their requirements of notice to absent spouses.
64. Whereas Mr. Justice Frankfurter was able to deliver the majority
opinion in 12 pages, his disagreeing colleagues required a total of 47 pages
to press their objections to his views.
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precise issue which has emerged after re-trial of the cause
following our reversal.
S. 'As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil,
upon which depends the power to exert judicial authority,
another State has a right.., to ascertain the truth or ex-
istence of that crucial fact.
. . . 1hat is immediately before us is the judgment of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
The conclusion it reached turns on its finding that the
spouses who obtained the Nevada decrees were not domiciled
there. The fact that the Nevada court found that they were
domiciled there is entitled to respect, and more .... But
simply because the Nevada court found that it had power to
award a divorce decree cannot, as we have seen, foreclose
re-examination by another State.... If this Court finds that
proper weight was accorded to the claims of power by the
court of one State in rendering a judgment the validity of
which is pleaded in defense in another State, that the burden
of overcoming such respect by disproof of the substratum
of fact-here domicil-on which such power alone can rest
was properly charged against the party challenging the
legitimacy of the judgment, that such issue of fact was left
for fair determination by appropriate procedure, and that a
finding adverse to the necessary foundation for any valid
sister-State judgment was amply supported in evidence, we
cannot upset the judgment before us.65
What the Court did here was reaffirm the rule of Bell v. Bell.
This rule states that the court of State A, in which neither party
is domiciled, has no jurisdiction to divorce the spouses, and that
the court of State B is not prevented from investigating the
existence vel non of domicil in State A by a recital thereof in
the decree of the State A court. To this rule the Supreme Court
added the requirement that "proper weight," (whatever that
might be in a particular case) must be accorded the finding of
domicil by the court of State A. The dangers of generalizing
much more about the scope of the decision are apparent from
the words of Professor Powell. Referring to the above decision,
he says:
It is certainly to the majority and not to the minority that
we must go for instruction on what possibilities are not
foreclosed by decree and opinion of the Court. This remains
true even if the opinion seems at crucial spots to shed dark-
65. 325 U.S. 227, 230, 233, 234 (1945).
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ness rather than light or if what is said at one place seems
to be contradicted or blurred and confused by what is said
at another. ... 6
The Sherrer and Coe cases were the next pronouncements of
the Court in this field. They represent an application of the
principle of the Davis case to a litigation made possible by the
decision in the second Williams case. Thus it is an instance of
State B's retrying the issue of domicil, which had already been
litigated in State A, where both parties were present, and the
defense of res judicata being interposed before the court of
State B. The opinion in Sherrer v. Sherrer will be the only one
considered here since the Court considered Coe v. Coe as a mere
companion case, involving the application of the Sherrer rule
to a situation which differed factually from the Sherrer case
only slightly. The Coes took their marital woes to Nevada,
whereas the Sherrers litigated theirs in Florida, but both couples
returned to Massachusetts. The only other factual difference is
that in the Sherrer case it was the original defendant who sub-
sequently contested the validity of the decree, whereas in the
Coe case the original plaintiff was the challenger.
A consideration of the Massachusetts court's interpretation
of the Davis case would be helpful in evaluating the impact of
the Sherrer decision. The Massachusetts opinion reads as follows:
The respondent relies on Davis v. Davis, a case which we
have interpreted 'as resting on a basis that the jurisdictional
facts were actually litigated and determined to exist in the
court granting the divorce.' The allegation as to residence
in the bill of complaint, which was denied in the answer,
did not constitute an actual litigation of the jurisdictional
facts... . The ruling in Davis v. Davis was based chiefly upon
decisions in cases not involving the marital relation and in
which the paramount rights of the State were not involved.
Any extension of that ruling to comprehend the facts of the
present case, which disclose nothing more than an agree-
ment as to custody and a formal uncontested hearing, must
come from the court which first pronounced the doctrine."7
[Italics ours.]
In both the above opinion and its opinion in the Coe case,0" the
Massachusetts court relied on Andrews v. Andrews. In the Coe
case the court said:
66. Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARV. L. Rv. 930 (1945).
67. 320 Mass. 351, 358 (1946).
68. Coe v. Coe, 320 Mass. 295 (1946).
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What happened was no more than an attempt to confer juris-
diction by consent in disregard of the interests of this Com-
monwealth, where the parties were both domiciled. 9
This, the Massachusetts court felt, involved an attempt to
confer by consent a jurisdiction which, as was pointed out in the
Andrews case, is not dependent on consent.
But it is obvious that inadequacy of the appearance or con-
sent of one person to confer jurisdiction over a subject
matter not resting on consent includes necessarily the want
of power of both parties to endow the court with jurisdiction
over a subject matter, which appearance or consent could
not give.70
With these considerations in mind, the expansive effect of the
overruling of the Andrews case, ". . . insofar as the rule of that
case may be said to be inconsistent with judgment herein an-
nounced,"' may better be estimated.
Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion. He first noted
that the Florida decree complied with procedural due process
and that due process, therefore, afforded no grounds for reliti-
gation. After also noting that the parties had assumed, as did
the Court, that the Florida decree was final and valid in the
state which rendered it, he then continued:
The question with which we are confronted, therefore, is
whether such a finding made under the circumstances pre-
sented by this case may, consistent with the requirements of
full faith and credit, be subjected to collateral attack in the
courts of a sister State in a suit brought by the defendant
in the original proceedings.... This court has held that the
doctrine of res adjudicata must be applied to questions ofjurisdiction in cases arising in state courts involving the
application of the full faith and credit clause where, under
the law of the state in which the original judgment was
rendered, such adjudications are not susceptible to collateral
attack. . . .We believe that . . . the requirements of full
faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking
a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a
sister State where there has been participation by the de-
fendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has
been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional
issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such col-
69. 320 Mass. 295, 302 (1946).
70. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 41 (1903).
71. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 353 (1948).
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lateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the
decree.7 2 [Italics ours.]
Because of the way the issue for decision was narrowed by
Chief Justice Vinson, the Sherrer case decided only that the
defendant in the prior litigation could not attack the earlier
decree collaterally in the courts of a sister state. The Coe de-
cision was likewise on narrow grounds since Mr. Justice Vinson,
referring to the Sherrer decision, decided only that,
... that principle is no less applicable where, as here, the
party initiating the collateral attack is the party in whose
favor the decree was entered .... 73
Thus the two cases together decide only that, if the plaintiff and
defendant both appeared and litigated in the first divorce action,
they may not collaterally attack that first decree in the courts of
another state.
This cautious restriction of the scope of the decision thus
leaves the legal profession with many unanswered questions.
First, what is meant by "appearance"? Will a special appearance
by mail suffice7 4 or must it be through counsel or in person? What
is meant by "litigation"? As Mr. Justice Frankfurter asks in
his dissenting opinion:
How much of a contest must it be? Must the contest be
bellicose or may it be pacific? Must it be fierce or may it be
tepid ?7
We might ask additional questions. What is "full opportu-
nity to contest"? Does this mean being notified by mail of the
pendency of an action in a distant state, and if so, does the de-
fendant's ability to go personally to that distant state have any
significance? Or is presence at the trial meant, and if so, does
presence or absence of defense counsel make a difference as to
the fullness of the opportunity? May the parties gain the benefit
of this rule to sanctify prior ex parte divorces by now filing a
general appearance for the defendant and asking leave to amend
to show jurisdiction nunc pro tune? What is left of the long
settled rule that a divorce may later be impeached by showing
fraud or collusion by the parties? How can this rule be applied
when, as tellingly pointed out by Professor Powell, 7 there was
72. Id. at 349.
73. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948).
74. Cf. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 324 Mass. 340 (1949).
75. 334 U.S. 343, 367 (1948).
76. Supra note 66, at 944-946.
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no fraud on the divorcing court, since that court knew, despite
its pious recitations, that the spouses were taking advantage of
its "cafeteria and curb service" ?7 Another question raised by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concerns the effect of the decision on
the commonly encountered injunctions against a domiciliary
prosecuting an out-of-state divorce action. Since everyone is
free to change his domicil at will, are these injunctions retro-
actively invalid because by implication they would seem to bind
the respondent even after he changed domicil? What, if any-
thing, is left of a state's control over the status of its domicili-
aries, if, after making a mutually satisfactory property settle-
ment, they go to a state with a six weeks' residence requirement
and a wide choice of easily available grounds for divorce, go
through the form of litigating a divorce, and return to that first
state free to remarry, having gotten that divorce on grounds
which at their true home may not even be deemed adequate for a
judicial separation, much less a termination of the marriage
status? What in substance remains of the theory that to the
states was reserved power over marriage and divorce, if this
easy method of circumventing one's home state law is available
to all who can afford to migrate, only to litigate and then return?
What of the problem of the Williams cases? Does the limited
scope of this decision mean that only the parties who were before
the Nevada court are bound by the finding of domicil? 78 And as
a corollary thereto, would Massachusetts be free to punish the
spouses for bigamous cohabitation upon their return with new
putative spouses? Further, would Massachusetts be able to dis-
regard the Nevada finding of domicil if one of the spouses died
absolutely intestate, leaving bona vacantia to which Massa-
chusetts claimed title as domicil of the intestate? How does this
Nevada finding of domicil affect the spouses' domicil for state
estate tax purposes? Mr. Justice Frankfurter poses the question
this way:
But the real question here is whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause can be used as a limitation on the power of a
State over its citizens who do not change their domicile, who
77. Id. at 946.
78. This problem was involved in Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951) but the Court disposed of this case on the ground that the New
York Court of Appeals was in error as to Florida law. The Court found
that under the law of Florida the daughter could not have questioned the
validity of her late father's Florida divorce.
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do not remove to another State, but who leave the State only
long enough to escape the rigors of its laws, obtain a divorce,
and then scurry back.7 9
To the extent that the Sherrer decision answers the above
question in the affirmative, the Court ensnares itself in the logical
circulus inextrabilis neatly stated by Mr. Justice White in the
Andrews case. He states it thus:
The principle dominating the subject is that the marriage
relation is so interwoven with public policy that the consent
of the parties is impotent to dissolve it contrary to the law
of domicil. The proposition relied upon, if maintained, would
involve this contradiction in terms: That marriage may not
be dissolved by the consent of the parties, but that they can,
by their consent accomplish the dissolution of the marriage
tie by appearing in a court foreign to their domicil and
wholly wanting in jurisdiction, and may subsequently com-
pel the courts of the domicil to give effect to such judgment
despite the prohibitions of the law of the domicil and the
rule of public policy by which it is enforced. 0
It is submitted that the questions above listed, which merely
indicate a few of the many uncertainties inherent in the judicial
evolution of the law as to mandatory recognition of sister-state
decrees of divorce under the aegis of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, and which make no pretense at exhausting the uncer-
tainties inherent in the present state of the law, suggest that
the course of decisions in the past seventy-nine years has made
no appreciable progress in reducing or putting an end to the
general doubts implicit in the present law on migratory divorces.
They further suggest that it is now time to consider the feasi-
bility of a legislative solution for the problem, inasmuch as the
cases examined have indicated that the judiciary is, ex necessi-
tate rei, not the proper organ of government to deal with a prob-
lem which is essentially one of reconciling conflicting state
policies in a matter of deepest concern to both the state and
national governments. In legislation it is believed that we may
find a solution which, while not a panacea for all the ills in the
present state of the law, may, nevertheless, take a long stride
forward in the direction of more objectivity and certainty in
the tests of the validity of divorce decrees for which recognition
in sister states is sought, and which should, to the extent that it
79. 334 U.S. 343, 362 (1948).
80. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 41 (1903).
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shifts the emphasis to objective standards, greatly reduce the
volume of litigation in this field, concurrent with a reduction of
the uncertainties which today are inherent in every "migratory
divorce." II
Before considering the various types of legislation available
as a remedy for the present unsatisfactory state of the law, a
few authorities, urging that in legislation lies a more suitable
agency to cope with the problem, might be considered here to
strengthen the conviction that the inadequacy of the judicial
solution points to corrective legislation.
Looking first to the decided cases, we find a few dicta on the
subject in three recent Supreme Court opinions.
In his concurring opinion in the first Williams case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter restates thoughts on the subject first expressed by
him in the Cornell Law Quarterly8' before joining the Court.
He says:
Judicial attempts to solve problems that are intrinsically
legislative-because their elements do not lend themselves
to judicial judgments or because the necessary remedies
are of a sort which judges cannot prescribe-are apt to be as
futile in their achievement as they are presumptuous in their
undertaking82
In the second Williams case, the concurring opinion of the
late Mr. Justice Murphy, joined in by the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Jackson, makes the point that:
Until the federal government is empowered by the Con-
stitution to deal uniformly with the divorce problem or until
uniform state laws are adopted, it is essential that definite
lines of demarcation be made as regards the scope and extent
of the varying state practices. 3
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in the same case sug-
gests less directly that legislative dealing with the problem would
be preferable. It reads:
And in the absence of further federal legislation under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, I should leave the effect of
divorce decrees to be determined as Congress commanded-
according to the laws and usages of the state where the de-
crees are entered.8 4
81. Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 528 (1928).
82. 317 U.S. 287, 305 (1942).
83. 325 U.S. 226, 243 (1945).
84. Id. at 274.
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Chief Justice Stone's endorsement of the proposition was
reflected in his dissenting opinion in the Yarborough case, joined
in by Mr. Justice Cardozo, where he said:
... much of the confusion and procedural deficiencies which
the constitutional provision alone has not avoided may be
remedied by legislation. .... 1-
Mr. Justice Frankfurter rephrases his opinion on the subject
while dissenting in the Sherrer case, with the words:
To attempt to shape policy so as to avoid disharmonies in our
divorce law was not a power entrusted to us, nor is thejudiciary competent to exercise it.... We cannot draw on
the available power for social invention afforded by the
Constitution for dealing adequately with the problem, be-
cause the power belongs to the Congress and not to the
Court.""
That Congress is aware of the inadequacy of the judiciary may
be seen from the bill introduced by Senator McCarran, which we
will consider infra, and from the following excerpt from the
remarks of Mr. Ramey, made while introducing a proposed con-
stitutional amendment:
But never was a matter more complicated by the see-sawing
back and forth of court decisions.... The confusion will go
on until we get a new set of laws that are uniform through-
out the country .... 7
Turning to the legal scholars, we first find support for our
thesis in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in his address given
to the City of New York Bar Association as the fourth annual
Cardozo Lecture. 3 He said:
Complete integration of our separate legal systems through
compulsory reciprocal recognition of process and execution
of judgments of course is beyond the judicial power of in-
novation. But it cannot be doubted that Congress is invested
with a range of power greatly exceeding that which it has
seen fit to exercise.89
Professor Edwin S. Corwin emphasizes the thought that ju-
dicial inadequacy is no bar to legislative action saying:
Nor should the limited initiative taken by the Court in this
matter in recent years deter Congress from action. The little
85. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n. 2 (1933).
86. 334 U.S. 348, 364 (1948).
87. 91 CONG. REc. 4171 (May 3, 1945).
88. Reprinted in 45 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1945).
89. Id. at 21.
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that can be accomplished by the judicial process of inclusion
and exclusion will go neither far nor fast toward meeting
present day necessities .... 90
Although the point could be belabored with additional excerpts
from both the dicta in random cases and from comments in the
law reviews,," the above quotations, it is believed, establish the
fact that the Supreme Court has only recently begun to admit
its consciousness of the futility of further attempts to solve by
litigation a problem which is essentially legislative in nature.
In so doing, the Court is conceding the truth of the opinions
shared by the commentators for some time past.
Turning to the three types of legislative solution available, let
us consider: first, uniform state laws, either as to the grounds
for divorce, or as to the conditions under which a state will
recognize the validity of decrees of sister states; second, a con-
stitutional amendment which would empower Congress to enact
uniform laws of domestic relations throughout the entire United
States; third, an act of Congress implementing the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
It is not our purpose to trace the history of previous unsuccess-
ful attempts along all three of these diverse routes to uniform-
ity.92 It is submitted that the first type of legislative attack is
doomed to failure by the mores of Nevada alone, for no state in
its position is likely to abandon voluntarily such a lucrative trade
as has been developed there at its "divorce mill. '9 3 Apart from
the self-interest of Nevada, experience shows that, despite the
attendance of delegates from forty-two states at the National
Congress on Uniform Divorce laws in 1906, only three states,
Delaware, New Jersey and Wisconsin, ever adopted the Uniform
Law there drafted.9 The failure in this direction led to a new
approach by the apostles of uniform laws on the state level;
they then proposed "an act relating to divorce jurisdiction and
90. Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. or PA. L. Ruv. 371,
389 (1933).
91. 33 CoL. L. Rsv. 854, 866 (1933); 1 MIAMI L. Q. 1, 18 (1917); 29
VA. L. REv. 557, 616 (1943).
92. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 364 n. 13 (1948), summarizes briefly
the history of past failures of three different modes of securing uniform
legislation. For a fuller treatment from the viewpoint of the sociologist
see LIGHTENBEmGER, DIvoRcE c. 8.
93. Ingram and Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada,
2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 302, 348 (1935).
94. For full text of the proposed Uniform Statute see The Report from
the Pennsylvania Commission on Divorce.
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to make uniform the law relating thereto." This proved an even
more dismal failure than its predecessor, being adopted by Ver-
mont only, in 1931,95 and repealed two years later.,0 The complete
lack of uniformity existent in state law today as to not only
grounds for divorce,97 but also residence requirements, procedure,
alimony and custody provisions, when considered together with
the admitted failure98 of all attempts at uniform state laws,
seems to definitely foreclose any hopes of legislative solution on
this level in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Attempts at a constitutional amendment have met with an even
more signal failure. Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out 9 that
since 1884 over seventy proposals for such an amendment have
been unsuccessfully made. These proposals have never been
favorably acted upon, and as far back as 1892, the thought that
an amendment was constitutionally unnecessary was phrased in
these words by an adverse report of a majority of the House
Judiciary Committee of the Fifty-Second Congress:
The committee suggests that Congress already has power
under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution to prescribe
the effect to be given in all other states to divorces granted
in any state. 00
The most recent protagonists of an amendment were Senator
Capper and Representative Ramey, and it is interesting to note
that the amendment is gradually dwindling in size from' the
original wording' 01 of the one introduced by Senator Capper in
1923, ' 2 at the urging of the General Federation of Women's
Clubs, to the very briefly worded joint resolution, "The Congress
shall have power to establish uniform laws with respect to mar-
riage and divorce."' 0 3
95. Vt. Laws 1931, No. 45.
96. Vt. Laws 1933, No. 38.
97. See 2 NELSON op. cit. supra note 58, at 612, for a chart graphically
illustrating the tremendous spread in the distribution and incidence of the
various grounds for divorce in the several states.
98. "Slight progress has been made in twenty years in the direction of
uniformity in divorce legislation by the action of individual States."
LIGHTENBERGER, Op. cit. supra note 92, at 197.
99. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 364, n. 13 (1948).
100. H.R. Rep. No. 1290, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892).
101. "The Congress shall have power to make laws which shall be uni-
form throughout the United States, on marriage and Aivorce, the legitima-
tion of children, and the care and custody of children affected by annulment
of marriage and by divorce."
102. LIGHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 92, at 198, 199.
103. See note 87 supra.
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There is no indication on today's legal horizon that the long
history of abortive attempts at amendment will reach a change
of fortune for the better. A brief review of state residence-
requirement statutes will demonstrate that thirty-three states
require one year's residence and nine others have longer "waiting
periods."1 14 It seems that more than twelve of these forty-two
states would be reluctant to give up their control over domestic
relations, at least when asked to abdicate their control in defer-
ence to a vaguely worded statute under which Congress is given
carte blanche to write a new national law of divorce, a law under
which the lax requirements of Nevada could conceivably be
made to look puritanical. Thus a constitutional amendment is
too remote a possibility to be of any present value as a vehicle
for carrying the legislative remedy from potentiality into ac-
tuality.
The remaining avenue of legislative approach to the problem
is immediately distinguished from the two methods discussed
above in that it has no history of unsuccessful attempts to preju-
dice its chances for popular and legislative acceptance. Prior to
Senator McCarran's bill no such attempt at a congressional
statute, as distinguished from a constitutional amendment, had
been made, at least since the Seventy-Fifth Congress convened
on January 5, 1937,15 and probably Senator McCarran's bill is
the first such bill introduced before Congress. 10 6
In the past, the focal point of attempts at legislative solution
has been to try to unify the grounds for divorce. Since "the Con-
stitution of the United States ... reserves authority over mar-
riage and divorce to each of the forty-eight states ... .,107 pre-
viously proposed legislation, being cast in the form of a law
taking control over the substantive law of marriage and divorce,
has necessarily been submitted in the form of a constitutional
amendment. This being so, the fact that an amendment has
always been suggested in the past is no argument against our
104. WARREN, SCHOuLE DivoRc MANuAL, 705-720 (1944).
105. CCH CONG. INDEX covering from the 75th through the present
session of Congress.
106. The writer relies on LIGHTENBERGER, op cit. supra note 92 for the
accuracy of this statement, which can be definitely ascertained only by a
complete examination of the indexes of each separate Congressional Record
from the 74th Congress back, since the CCH service begins with the 75th
Congress.
107. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
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contemplated statute. We do not propose to deal with the sub-
stantive law of divorce nor the several states' control over the
grounds therefor, but we plan merely to exercise the power
conferred upon Congress by Article IV, Section 1 of the Con-
stitution to "prescribe" the "effect" of one type of "judicial pro-
ceedings of every other State."
A review of the dicta of the Supreme Court and the writings
of some of the most learned legal and constitutional commen-
tators makes a strong argument for the constitutionality of such
a statute. Having thus established a prima facie case for the
constitutionality of such legislation, we shall then proceed to
consider the problems to be dealt with in drafting such a statute.
Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in the Yarborough case, asserted
that in migratory divorce cases, ". .. there is often an inescapable
conflict of interest of the two states," and that in attempting to
resolve such conflicts there necessarily comes a point beyond
which:
the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own
borders involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate
domestic interest of the other.10 8
He then makes the point that the Court must decide for itself
the extent to which, in such a situation, one state may qualify
or deny rights claimed under proceedings of other states, in the
absence of provisions of Congress more specific than the general
terms of the Act of May 26, 1790. Referring to the desirability
and constitutionality of such a further enactment, he states:
The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as
defined by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully
defined, expanded or contracted by Congress.... The con-
stitutional provision giving Congress power to prescribe the
effect to be given to acts, records and proceedings would have
been quite unnecessary had it not been intended that Con-
gress should have a latitude broader than that given the
courts by the full faith and credit clause alone.109
The majority opinion in the first Williams case, while it did
not adopt this argument, at least refrained from questioning its
validity. Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
Whether Congress has the power to create exceptions [citing
the above dissent] is a question on which we express no
108. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 (1933).
109. Id. at 215, n. 2.
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view. It is sufficient here to note that Congress... has not
done so .... 1o
In his concurring opinion in the same case Mr. Justice Frank-
furter likewise left the question open, saying, "There will be
time enough to consider the scope of its power in this regard
when Congress chooses to exercise it." '111
Speaking for the majority in the second Williams case, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter again pointed out that the Court did not
intimate its opinion on this subject when he said, ".... The reach
of Congressional power given by Article IV, Section 1 is not
before us" (citing articles by Mr. Justice Jackson and Professor
Cook, noted infra) .112
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in the same case, joined
in by Mr. Justice Douglas, goes further in supporting the ex-
istence of such a power in Congress, saying:
But, while Congress might, under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, prescribe the 'effect' in other states of decrees based
on the finding, I do not think the federal courts can, by their
mere label, attach jurisdictional consequences to the state's
requirement of domicile.113
The same opinion again suggests the Congressional power in
the phrase, "And in the absence of further federal legislation
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause .... ,, 4
In the Sherrer case, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for
the majority, says:
We, of course, intimate no opinion as to the scope of Con-
gressional power to legislate under Article IV, Section 1,
of the Constitution. 15
It is noteworthy that the context in which these words are used
in fact argues for the existence of such a power. They are ap-
pended as a note to a statement saying that the decisions in the
Davis and related cases are "clearly indicative of the result to be
reached here." The implication in the addition of the quoted
note is that such a result is to be reached unless Congress other-
wise provides, by using the power as to which the Court "inti-
mates no opinion." Hence, "intimating no opinion," in the set-
110. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
111. Id. at 306.
112. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229, n .5 (1948).
113. Id. at 270, n .10.
114. Id. at 274.
115. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352, n. 18 (1948).
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ting of this case, paradoxically enough, seems to suggest the
existence of such a power.
In his dissenting opinion in the Sherrer case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter takes a view more positive than those expressed by
him in the Williams case, saying:
And so long as the Congress had not exercised its powers
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to meet the special
problems raised by divorce decrees .... 216
Thus Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position has evolved from a
cautious intimation of no opinion to a positive assumption that
Congress does possess the power to legislate on the divorce
problem under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Although these dicta make a reasonable argument for the
existence in Congress of a power to handle the problem of divorce
decree recognition under the power given it to "prescribe" the
"effects" of "judicial proceedings," the existence of such a power
in vacuo or as a matter of argumentation is not enough. Our
statute must be found to be constitutionally warranted in the
opinion of at least five members of the Court. Therefore, it is
interesting to note that Justices Jackson, 17 Black and Douglas, 18
Frankfurter, and the late Mr. Justice Murphy,", have expressly
affirmed the existence of such a power, and Chief Justice Vinson
may have done so in the Sherrer opinion. If this be true, the
prima facie case we attempted to work out would, perforce, seem
to be established, both in theory, and in "the intensely practical
consideration" of finding five sympathetic members of the
Court.110
The law review articles on this subject are more positive in
their assertions of the feasibility and constitutionality of the
type of statute under consideration. The three legal essays which,
it is felt, were the most influential in molding current legal
thought into a favorable disposition toward Congressional im-
plementation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause will be sum-
116. Id. at 364.
117. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit, 45 CoL. L. Ruv. 1 (1945).
118. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 274 (1945).
119. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 364 (1948).
120. The remaining members of the Court have not availed themselves
of several opportunities to express their disapproval of the theory that
Congress has such a power. Query, whether the extremely unsatisfactory
condition of the case law has begotten that rara avis, a proposition of law
as to which the present Court is in unanimous agreement.
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marized in concluding our prima facie argument for the validity
of the statutory solution.
The first article, chronologically, was that of Professor Cook
which originally appeared in the Yale Law Journal,"', in 1919,
and then was incorporated into his treatise on the conflict of
laws.122 He states:
In spite of all the doubt and confusion no attempt has been
made by Congress to 'prescribe' more clearly the 'effect' of
state judgments in other states....
That Congress has the power to do far more than it has thus
far done seems clear, both from the words of the clause itself
and from the history of that clause in the convention which
framed the present Constitution.'23
In 1933, shortly before the Yarborough decision, Professor
Corwin wrote:
Indeed there are few clauses of the Constitution, the merely
literal possibilities of which have been so little developed as
the "full faith and credit" clause . . . it does not seem
extravagant to argue that Congress may under the clause
describe a certain type of divorce and say that it shall be
granted recognition throughout the Union, and that no
other kind shall. 124
Mr. Justice Jackson added impetus to the argument by stating:
It is also suggested that Congress has power to prescribe
the type of divorce judgment that is entitled to extraterri-
torial recognition. The Court has had no occasion to decide
such questions, but I should say it has been fairly ostenta-
tious in leaving the way open to sustain such enactments
without embarrassment. 25
Other law review articles favoring this type of legislation
might be cited. 23 These three are quoted here because various
members of the Court have consistently relied on them in their
discussions of the subject.
Against this background of Supreme Court dicta and law
review articles, which, it is submitted, make out a prima facie
121. Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 28 YALE L. J. 421 (1919).
122. Coox, op. cit. supra, note 84.
123. Id. at 91.
124. Corwin, supra note 90, at 388.
125. Lecture delivered Dec. 7, 1944 under the auspices of the Committee
on Post-Admission Legal Education, of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York.
126. Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit,
29 VA. L. REv. 557, 598 (1943).
Washington University Open Scholarship
82 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
case for the constitutional validity of a statute passed as an
exercise of what we might call the "prescribing power," let us
now turn to a consideration of the problems involved in the
drafting of such a statute.
Ill
The statute proposed will express national policy, and we must
consciously advert to this policy in drafting the legislation. This
thought is expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in the words:
Always to be kept in mind in dealing with these problems is
that the policy ultimately to be served in application of the
clause is the federal policy of 'a more perfect union' of our
legal systems. No local interest and no balance of local in-
terests can rise above this consideration. 127
The federal interest lies not in determining which of the vary-
ing and competing views of the several states as to substantive
grounds for divorce is, or would be, if adopted on a national
scale, the more socially desirable because the better adapted to
protect and encourage the unity of the family, and hence, to
lessen the incidence of divorce and the evils attributed thereto.
Rather the federal interest rests in promulgating a rule which
will narrow the area wherein the policies of the several states
may clash and deadlock over a matter in which each claims para-
mount and exclusive rights of adjudication. Choices in the realm
of morals rest with the state legislatures. Hence, the statute
must continue to leave each of the states as free as possible to
follow its own bent with regard to the marriage institution.
It is to be noted parenthetically that the statute contemplates
no limitation on the power of the states to recognize as valid,
decrees which fail to meet its test for mandatory recognition, if
the local conflict of laws rule so indicates. The statutory aim is
a more orderly functioning of our federal constitutional system,
and to secure this we must, "find some way of confining each
state's authority to matters and persons that are by some stand-
ard its own."'12
What is sought is a rule whereby State B need recognize di-
vorce decrees of State A only when those decrees are given to
spouses in whose marital status State A has an abiding and
legitimate interest. This interest need not necessarily be perma-
127. Jackson, supra note 117 at 27
128. Williams v. North Carolina, 37 U.S. 287, 315 (1942).
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nent, but it should be of such a nature that, in the light of the
mobile state of our present civilization, it is not unreasonable
to compel State B to recognize this decree. If this interest exist
in State A, then compulsory recognition by State B will not be
pro tanto an intrusion into a matter in which State B has a
paramount interest, albeit State B still may have some, or even
great, concern in the status of the spouses whose divorce by
State A it must recognize. Such a rule would reflect a considera-
able improvement over the situation resulting from the Sherrer
decision where State A, with in fact no interest, can impose its
decree on State B, which has a paramount and seemingly exclu-
sive interest as the real home of the spouses.
It is this lack of an objective standard that has been the source
in a large degree of the conflicting claims of the states. Each
state, using different standards or a standard such as domicil,
which because of its subjective elements can be variously applied
by two or more courts looking at the same factual situation, has
been able to arrive at directly opposite findings as to which state
has jurisdiction to divorce a given married couple. Indeed, the
subjectivity implicit in the common law concept of domicil, em-
bodying as it does the two components of physical presence
coinciding with an animus manendi, has given rise to one school
of thought, headed by Professor Cook'2 and the late Mr. Justice
Rutledge, 13° which would entirely eliminate domicil as the basis
of jurisdiction of a state court to decree divorces. Professor Cook
urges that the test be:
... a sufficiently substantial contact by way of residence to
make it not unreasonable for that State to hold that the
person in question is domiciled there: this even though the
person also has a sufficiently substantial contact with another
State to make it not unreasonable for that State also to find
that the domicil is there.1"1
Little practical assistance is found in this suggestion. "A
sufficiently substantial contact" is an expression of uncertain
content, in the never-never land with other elusives like "fraud,"
"negligence," and "reasonableness." Professor Cook offers no
guideposts which will direct us to the concrete contacts for which
he would have the court look. Unless we supply the state courts
129. CoOK, op. cit. supra note 34.
130. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226. 255-261 (1945).
131. COOK, op. cit. supra note 34, at 467.
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with a fairly well-defined objective test, we will be confronted
with an endless series of cases from State B being taken to the
Supreme Court because State B found (a) that the contacts
relied upon by State A were not substantial at all, or else (b)
not so substantial as to make it "not unreasonable" for State A
to assume jurisdiction for divorce. Professor Cook here seems
to be guilty of the epistemological failing of trying to define a
concept in terms more vague than that which is being defined,
ignotum per ignotius. Nor is Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion any
more enlightening to one who is trying to spell out a simple
straight-forward test, which will not be a Pandora's box of
further legal problems. The late Justice stated:
This [domicil] discarded, choice then would be forced be-
tween the ideas of transiency with due process safeguards
and some minimal establishment of more than casual or
transitory relations in the new community giving the new-
comer something of objective substance identifying him with
its life.132
Mr. Justice Rutledge then extols this suggested test as being an
improvement over the "inconstant and capricious" effects of
domicil as a yardstick. It is submitted that a mere reading of
this formulation of the measure of jurisdiction should convince
us that there is no room for "some minimal establishment of
more than casual relations in the new community" in a statute,
the avowed purpose of which is to lessen the intensity of the
interstate strife by supplying more workable norms as to the
when and the whence of full faith and credit.133
The suggestions just considered do serve one useful function;
they focus our attention on the inadequacy of the concept of
domicil as the jurisdictional sine qua non. Being cognizant of
this fact, which may well be the fundamental difficulty in the
entire problem, we must realize that we may either (a) continue
domicil as the test, in which case no betterment is made; or (b)
drop domicil altogether; or (c), while retaining domicil to satisfy
the Court's long-settled requirement thereof, add some additional
factor of an objective nature, such as a minimum fixed period
of residence in the divorce-decreeing state. Under alternative
(c) these two requirements would be coupled in the statute as
two of the elements which must be found to exist before the
132. Id. at 259.
133. Powell, supra note 66, at 1009.
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State A decree is entitled to mandatory recognition in State B.
Of the above three alternatives, the first is of little value because
it does not improve upon the present law. The second, although
it may be within the constitutional power of Congress, flies so
directly in the face of a long line of dicta, reiterated in all the
Supreme Court cases reviewing the divorce problem,34 that its
constitutionality is extremely dubious. The dictum of Chief
Justice Vinson in the Sherrer case is the most recent authorita-
tive pronouncement on the subject, and it shows no retreat from
the long-settled position of the Court, nor does it lend any en-
couragement to those who share the views of Professor Cook and
Mr. Justice Rutledge. The opinion reads:
That the jurisdiction of the Florida court to enter a valid
decree of divorce was dependent upon petitioner's domicile
in that State is not disputed.135
There would seem to be no need to run the constitutional risk in
the light of the third alternative available.
The elimination of the first two alternatives necessitates our
framing a requirement that State A must find the divorce plain-
tiff is (a) domiciled in, and (b) has actually resided in State A
for the selected period. The length of the residence required
should reflect the fact that the plaintiff has dwelt in State A long
enough for him to have become a member of its community for a
period which reasonably could be said to justify State A in taking
an interest in his status. More importantly, he should be in State
A for a sufficiently long period to make it not unreasonable for
Congress to order, in effect, that all states must recognize the
legitimacy of State A's interest in his status, to the extent of
giving full faith and credit to the divorce decree of State A.
Selecting any minimum period involves, in effect, if not in
form, a mandatory surrender by some of the states of their con-
trol over residence requirements. This is true at least as to
divorces of the affected states for which extraterritorial faith
and credit is demanded. Present requirements vary from
Nevada's prerequisite of six weeks' residence'36 to as long as
134. See Williams v. North Carolina 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) ; Williams
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942) ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32,
41 (1938); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 570 (1906); Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 41 (1903) ; Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 177 (1901).
135. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948).
136. Nnv. COMP. LAWS ANN., § 9460 (Supp. 1941).
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five years' residence required in certain circumstances by Massa-
chusettS 137 and Indiana.138 Indeed, until 1949 South Carolina did
not allow divorces at all.1 9 Approximately thirty-three states
now use one year for the residence requirement in most of the
divorce actions allowed in those states, whereas nine others re-
quire a longer period. 40 The exact period chosen is not so im-
portant as the fact that an objective standard is set out. More-
over, it is felt that, in view of the expected added certainty to be
gained from the federal statute, some sacrifice by the various
states as to their views on residence requirements is not an un-
reasonable price to demand. For this reason, it is suggested that
the statute adopt twelve months' residence, plus domicil in State
A, as a prerequisite to full faith and credit for its decrees of
divorce. It is believed that this period would tend greatly to re-
duce the number of persons able to leave home for a migratory
divorce which would be enforceable in their home states, and that
this reduction in the number of migratory divorces would greatly
lessen the importance of the problem. Furthermore, a residence
of twelve months in the divorce-decreeing state is, in view of the
increasingly migratory character of our populace, a sufficiently
durable minimum contact to give the decreeing state an interest
in the status of the spouse which Congress can with a good degree
of fairness call upon other states to respect.
Our next task is to transform this double standard, with its
subjective test of domicil and its objective test of twelve months'
residence, into an objective, easily understood and easily work-
able test. To do this we might use the conclusive presumption.
The statute would then provide that State A must find both
domicil and the twelve months' residence before its divorce de-
cree is entitled to mandatory credit. But it would further pro-
vide that review by State B, when examining the record of State
A to determine whether State A had jurisdiction, should be
limited to an inquiry to see whether State A made a warranted
finding of the twelve months' residence, and that upon this being
found by State B, domicil in State A should be conclusively pre-
sumed.
137. MAss. GEN. LAWS, c. 208, §§ 4, 5 (1932).
138. IND. ANN. STATS., § 3-1201 (Burns 1933).
139. S.C. CONsT. Art. 17, § 3 (1895), amended 1949, S.C. Laws 1949, No.
95. 140. WARREN, op. cit., supra note 104, at 705-720.
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If it be objected that one state is always free to examine the
existence of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the court for
whose decree recognition is sought, we are able to reply that such
is the law, absent a statement of Congress that such a review
will not be allowed to defeat full faith and credit upon the finding
designated by Congress as sufficient therefor. This can be demon-
strated by directing attention to the opinion of Mr. Justice
Bradley in Thompson v. Whitman,14 1 the case in which, according
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the implications of Article IV, Sec-
tion 1, of the Constitution "... . first received the sharp analysis of
this Court ... ."'-2 The doctrine of the Thompson case is taken
to be that only when the jurisdiction of the court of the first state
is not impeached, either as to the subject matter or the person,
is the record of that judgment entitled to full faith and credit.
This concededly is the law today as pointed out in the majority
opinion in the second Williams case.143 But, and this is the crucial
point for our purposes, Thompson v. Whitman does not declare
that State B is always free to re-examine the existence of juris-
diction of the court of State A by reason of any provision of the
Constitution alone. Rather, it so states as a matter of interpreta-
tion of the constitutional provision together with the Act of May
26, 1790. This, therefore, does not make this case, nor any of
its successors, authority for the proposition that there is a con-
stitutional right in State B to look at the jurisdiction of the
court in State A. The case only decides that the Act of 1790,
when construed with Article IV, Section 1, did not take away
that right which each colony formerly had to treat the judgments
of the other colonies as foreign judgments. This, it is submitted,
leaves unprejudiced the power of Congress to suspend this power
as to our type of judgments, namely divorce decrees.
In Thompson v. Whitman, the Court said:
Without that provision of the Constitution [Article IV,
Section 1] ... and the act of Congress passed to carry it into
effect, it is clear that the record in question would not be
conclusive as to the facts necessary to give the justices of
Monmouth County jurisdiction.... It has been supposed that
this act, in connection with the constitutional provision...
had the effect of rendering the judgments of each State
141. 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873).
142. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 227 (1945).
143. Id. at 228.
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equivalent to domestic judgments in every other State....
It must be admitted that no decision has ever been made on
the precise point .... On the whole, we think it clear that
the jurisdiction of the Court by which a judgment is ren-
dered in any State may be questioned in a collateral proceed-
ing in another State, notwithstanding the provision of the
fourth article of the Constitution and the law of 1790.
[Italics ours.] 4
That the Supreme Court considered this question to be within
the legislative power of Congress appears even more clearly from
the earlier case of D'Arcy v. Ketchum,1'4 decided in 1850. There
Mr. Justice Catron said:
In construing the act of 1790, the law as it stood when the
act was passed must enter into that construction; so that the
existing defect in the old law may be seen, and its remedy by
the act of Congress comprehended . . . the question is,
whether it ... intended ... to declare a new rule, which
would bind the citizens of one state to the laws of another
.... in our opinion Congress did not intend to overthrow the
old rule by the enactment that such faith and credit should
be given to the records of judgments as they had in the
State where made.., we concur with the various decisions
made by State courts in holding that Congress did not intend
to embrace judicial records of this description. [Italics
ours.] 146
That subsequent decisions have lost sight of the distinction
between what is required by the constitutional provisions of
Article IV, Section 1, on the one hand, and what is required by
the Act of 1790, on the other, is demonstrated by the opinion of
Mr. Justice White in the Andrews case. There, with reference
to the decision in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company,147 a
case in which Mr. Justice Gray rested the decision on the fourth
article of the Constitution and the Act of 1790, Mr. Justice
White said:
Yet it was held that, in so far as the extra-territorial effect
of the judgment was concerned, the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the State and its courts was open to in-
quiry, and if jurisdiction did not exist the enforcement of
the judgment was not compelled by reason of the due faith
and credit clause of the Constitution. [Italics ours.] 14 8
144. 18 Wall. 457, 461 (U.S. 1873).
145. 11 How. 165, 174 (U.S. 1850).
146. Ibid.
147. 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
148. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 39 (1903).
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This indicates that the Court lost sight of the fact that the
Pelican case rested on the combination of Article IV and the
Act of Congress. The Court still talks loosely on this point, as
may be seen from the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in the ma-
jority opinion in the first Williams case. There he said:
This Court accordingly classified Haddock v. Haddock with
that group of cases which hold that when the courts of one
state do not have jurisdiction either of the subject matter
or of the person of the defendant, the courts of another state
are not required by virtue of the full faith and credit clause
to enforce the judgment. [Italics ours.] 149
It is believed that this examination of these early cases shows
that there is no constitutional barrier, absent due process ob-
jections to be considered infra, to Congress's providing that the
finding of the facts it designates as conditions precedent to the
securing of full faith and credit shall be conclusive upon all other
courts in the United States. It is with this thought in mind that
we might decide that the first statute on the subject of mandatory
recognition of divorce decrees should not, as a matter of wise
legislative discretion, seek to exhaust the power of Congress in
this direction. Rather it should use only so much of that power
as is necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose, keeping the
closest ties with past practice that may be retained consistently
with the objective of reducing uncertainties and needless litiga-
tion. For this reason the statute allows State B to review the
record of the proceedings of State A to search for a finding of the
twelve months' residence. This permits the states to retain some
power to inquire into the jurisdictional facts, yet so restricts this
power, by confining it to reviewing for the easily identifiable
twelve months' residence, that the area for dispute is, for prac-
tical purposes, as effectively curtailed as if the statute had made
the bare finding thereof conclusive. At the same time the break
with the past will not be so complete as if the record's recital of
the findings of the jurisdictional facts were made conclusive, as
is done in the statute proposed by Senator McCarran.1 50
149. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
150. The text of the statute proposed by Senator McCarran reads:
Be it enacted... [etc.] That where a state has exercised through its
courts jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses, the decree of
divorce thus rendered must be given full faith and credit in every
other state as a dissolution of such marriage provided (1) the decree
is final; (2) the decree is valid in the state where rendered; (3) the
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Our task involves more than the technical limits upon the
power of Congress. A bill which seems not to depart too radically
from the present law and procedure has better chances for enact-
ment and popular acceptance than does one which on its face
contains a radical departure from the accepted procedure. The
success of this technique of leaving what appears to be a free
choice to the states may be appreciated by considering the prac-
tical result of the eighty per cent state death tax credit on the
federal estate tax,151 and the credit used in the federal social
security statutes.15 2
The due process objection must also be considered. Here
again, as in the argument for the existence of the power of
Congress to legislate on the subject, we shall confine our efforts
to establishing a prima facie case for the proposition that the
due process clauses of the Constitution do not invalidate such a
statute. It is the due process requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment which the statute must satisfy, because if the divorce de-
fendant were to claim in State B that the effect of State B's
mandatory recognition of the State A decree of divorce was to.
deny him due process, it would not be the law of State A or
State B which would be of operative effect, but rather the federal
statute which imposed the duty on State B to accord faith and
credit to the decree of State A upon finding it measures up to the
federal norm. This point is noted, not to suggest that there are
different tests as to what satisfies due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, but to add weight to the argumen-
tative value of cases to be discussed. These cases were decided
after the enactment of the Fifth, but before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The early cases considered above, notably D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
and the older cases upon which it rested, Mills v. Duryee6 53 and
decree contains recitals setting forth that the jurisdictional prerequi-
sites of the State to the granting of the divorce have beeen met; and(4) the State wherein the decree was rendered was the last state
wherein the spouses were domiciled together as husband and wife or
the defendant in the proceeding for divorce was personally subject to
the jurisdiction of the State wherein the decree was rendered or ap-
peared generally in the proceedings therefor. In all such cases except
cases involving intrinsic fraud the recitals of the decree of divorce
shall constitute a conclusive determination of the jurisdictional facts
necessary to the decree.
151. INT. Rv. CODM, § 813 (b).
"152. 49 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C., §§ 301, 302 (1946).
153. 7 Cranch 481 (U.S. 1813).
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Hampton v. M'Connel"4 fall in this category. Nevertheless,
these cases contain no suggestion that the power of Congress,
discussed in D'Arcy v. Ketchum with regard to the Act of 1790,
would have violated the due process clause had it been exercised
in the manner we now propose.
The discussion in Thompson v. Whitman took place after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, and again no
suggestion that due process was involved appears in this opinion.
The discussion of due process in Pennoyer v. Neff might be
urged as an argument against our position, but we might well dis-
tinguish away the force of such an argument on several grounds.
First, the Pennoyer case talks about the Act of 1790, not the
constitutional provision, as the basis of its statements. That
appears from these words:
In the earlier cases, it was supposed that the act gave to all
j udgments the same effect in other States which they had by
law in the State where rendered. But this view was after-
wards qualified so as to make the act applicable only when
the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the
parties and of the subject matter. 55
There are two other passages in the opinion where the Court
discusses the effect of the Act of 1790, as distinguished from
that of the Constitution itself."5 Second, the Pennoyer case was
explicitly limited to strictly in personam judgments. This fact
alone makes it distinguishable. A decree of divorce is universally
recognized not to be a purely in personam decree, although it is
true that its exact nature has never been accurately defined.1
5 7
Third, the Pennoyer case explicitly excepts status and divorce
cases from its scope.'58
To bolster our case we might quote a dictum of Mr. Justice
Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee. 9 This passage in its context
indicates that divorce decrees are to be treated differently from
other judgments jurisdiction-wise. It reads:
Whatever may be the rule with regard to decrees concerning
status or its incidents,... an ordinary personal judgment
154. 3 Wheat. 234 (U.S. 1818).
155. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877).
156. Id. at 730, 731.
157. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942).
158. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733, 734 (1877).
159. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
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for money, invalid for want of service amounting to due
process of law, is as ineffective in the state as it is outside
of it.60
The suggested distinction is based on the following analysis:
first, in personam judgments, if void where decreed due to lack of
due process in a failure of service, are void everywhere; second,
status decrees, though (under the law as it was when Mr. Justice
Holmes spoke) invalid outside of the state where decreed, were
valid where rendered; hence with a different congressional en-
actment status decrees might be valid everywhere.
We might also buttress our position with two early cases de-
cided before Thompson v. Whitman by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusettslel and the Supreme Court of Illinois.1s
Both cases held that the Act of 1790 did make recitals of the
finding of jurisdictional facts conclusive. In Hall v. Williams,0 3
the Massachusetts decision, Chief Justice Parker stated:
The full faith and credit required to be given in each State
to the judicial proceedings of other states, will prevent any
evidence to contradict the facts which show a jurisdiction,
if such appear on the record. 6 4
The Illinois Supreme Court in a pre-Thompson v. Whitman
interpretation of the Act of 1790 expressed a similar view. In
Zepp v. Hager, 65 it said:
The general doctrine, no doubt, is, where it appears, from
the record, the court which pronounced the judgment, hadjurisdiction by service of process or the personal appearance
of the defendant, it will, under the constitution and the act
of Congress, be deemed conclusive of the rights of the par-
ties, and no evidence can be heard to impeach it.66
These cases are noted to suggest that it was not thought
shocking by some state courts that Congress might provide that
a finding of jurisdiction by a court of record might be deemed
conclusive as to the jurisdictional facts. The rationale of such
a belief is as follows: first, practice of the courts in England and
some of the American Colonies was to hold that the records of
domestic tribunals import absolute verity in relation to juris-
160. Id. at 92.
161. Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232 (Mass. 1828).
162. Zepp v. Hager, 70 Ill. 223 (1873).
163. 6 Pick. 232 (Mass. 1828).
164. Id. at 247.
165. 70 Ill. 223 (1873).
166. Id. at 226.
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dictional as well as to other facts in all collateral proceedings;
second, it would be but a slight extension of such practice to
hold that on a national plane, Congress could consider the state
courts as "domestic" in terms of national unity; third, in view
of this Congress could declare that the findings of any state court
as to facts, jurisdictional or otherwise, will be conclusive. It is
submitted that the cases discussed do not disclose a constitutional
barrier to the enactment of such a statute by Congress.
Choice of language for the statute is the next task. Our
primary audience (after the legislators who must vote on it and
to whom it must be, perforce, intelligible) will be the judiciary
of the several states and the members of the bars thereof who
seek to advise clients "irked by its laws concerning the severance
of the marriage tie."''1 7 Since the rule of conduct is one directed
at the conduct of state courts in deciding whether or not to recog-
nize a foreign decree, the language used need not be that on the
level of the layman. At the same time we should try to exclude
handy, but elastic, legal catch-all phrases, such as those com-
plained of in the criticisms of the language used in the court
decisions on this subject.
As to the form of the statute, since it deals with the action of
state courts, some type of the "direct control of conduct" tech-
nique of dealing with the problem seems called for. A generalized
advance statement of the powers and duties of the reviewing
court when the decree of another state is proffered for recogni-
tion appears to be best adapted to the job to be done. Simpliciter,
the statute merely aims to tell the state courts ahead of time
what they must, and what they may, do in deciding whether to
recognize a sister state's decree of divorce. Our choice is fairly
easy here since the principal alternative to a statutory scheme
of control, namely, case-to-case development of the generalized
advanced statement, has already failed in practical operation.
How far to particularize and how much to leave in generalized
terms to be filled in by interpretation is indeed a problem. But
we approach it with a prejudice against a too generalized state-
ment of the selected rule, because this generalization has been
one of the chief factors contributing to the failure of the case-
to-case solution of the problem.
167. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 361 (1948).
Washington University Open Scholarship
94 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Also to be considered is whether we must define words in the
statute. This turns on whether the words selected are of suffi-
ciently uncertain content as to be open to conflicting interpreta-
tions on the state court level.
The statute suggested by Senator McCarran, noted above,108
might be examined at this point. The introductory sentence
wisely limits the effect of the decree to the "dissolution of such
marriage," and does not purport to deal with alimony, custody,
support and the like. The statute also limits the scope of its
operation to divorces granted by courts, thus obviating the ques-
tion posed by Warren 169 as to whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has taken such a power away from the state legislatures.
The first two clauses require that the decree be (1) final and (2)
valid where rendered, thus making no change from the case law.
The third provision requires that the decree contain a recital that
jurisdictional prerequisites of the decreeing state have been met.
This would seem to make no change in the law, for a decree
which did not satisfy the requirement for validity locally would
hardly be more valid elsewhere. There is a conflict here between
clause two and clause three. Clause two requires that the decree
in fact be valid, whereas clause three requires only a recital that
it be valid. If clause three were to be given effect, a state would
be powerless to examine to see if clause two were complied with.
Clause four requires either that the divorce-decreeing state be
the last matrimonial domicil, or that the defendant have appeared
or have been personally served in the proceeding. This does not
commend itself to us, for it seems to be a step backward.
The unsatisfactory nature of this part of the statute can be
shown by the following hypothetical case. Suppose: W, a wife
who was married at her home in Massachusetts, went to live in
California with her husband. W was then deserted by her hus-
band who went to parts unknown. W returned to her family
home in Massachusetts, being unable to support herself in Cali-
fornia. Under clause four W would be unable to divorce the
deserting husband, upon whom she could not make personal
service, in any state except California. This would be true even
though by today's case law she is free to establish her own domicil
in any state she chooses and then divorce H on constructive
168. See note 150 supra.
169. WARREN, op. cit. supra note 104.
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service. Assuming that she lived for five or ten years in Massa-
chusetts, clause four would still deprive Masachusetts of power
over the status of W, who, by every test, would be a citizen,
resident, and domiciliary of Massachusetts, and a person over
whose status Massachusetts should have control.
The concluding sentence first excepts from its scope cases
involving "intrinsic fraud," which is not defined in the statute.
It then states that a recital of the four findings enumerated
above shall constitute a conclusive determination of the jurisdic-
tional facts necessary to the decree. The memorandum attached
to this tentative draft by Senator McCarran does not treat the
scope of congressional power or the validity of the precise exer-
cise of that power under the statute as offered. It consists merely
of an argument that Congress does have power to legislate on
this subject.
In summary, Senator McCarran's statute does not by its terms
apply at all to those divorces in which only one spouse is domi-
ciled in the decreeing state and before the court, and the other
spouse is only constructively served. Hence it does not touch the
largest problem in the migratory divorce field. As to the cases
it purports to cover, in requiring either matrimonial domicil or
personal jurisdiction, it seems to retrogress to the oft-criticized
Haddock rule. Hence it does not recommend itself as an accept-
able solution.
After considering some of the main problems with which we
are faced, and having examined the draft of Senator McCarran's
bill, we now turn our attention to the actual preparation of our
statute. In so doing, we can use either a brief statement of
legislative purpose or a short title which will indicate this aim.
Such a title might read as follows: "An Act to provide for uni-
formity in the recognition of divorce decrees of the Courts of
the several States."
We should bear in mind that paragraph headings or subtitles
are useful to the reader and to courts trying to construe either
the meaning or scope of the various parts. Thus, inasmuch as the
subject dealt with will require several paragraphs, selection of an
appropriate heading for each section is a part of the proper
preparation of the statute.
Since "coverage" of the statute is invariably the first question
to arise in connection with any statute containing directions of
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the "thou shalt or shalt not" type, the initial part of our statute
should indicate the decrees covered by the act. In this same
portion, before prescribing what are the conditions which must
be met by a decree in order to entitle it to mandatory credit, it
seems desirable to state what is the effect of such credit. This
done, the balance of the initial section can state the general rule
promulgated. The succeeding sections will state the limitations
or qualifications which must be added thereto for the sake of
feasibility and compliance with due process requirements. Noting
in the first section that limitations are to follow in a later portion
will obviate the seeming conflict that would appear on the face
of the statute if a categorical general statement were made in the
first section and modifiers added later to derogate from this seem-
ingly universal rule with which the statute commenced. With
these thoughts in mind, the first section might read as follows:
General Provisions-Subject to the provisions of sections
two and three hereof, whenever any state has undertaken
through its courts to enter a decree of divorce, such decree
must be recognized in every other state as a valid dissolution
of the marriage status of the plaintiff and defendant in such
divorce action; provided that the record of the court issuing
the decree contains a finding that (a) the divorce is final,
and (b) the divorce plaintiff was domiciled in the state whose
court issues the decree, and (c) the divorce plaintiff was
resident in such state for at least twelve months next pre-
ceding the filing of the petition for divorce.
The first group of qualifications which must be applied to the
general rule stated in the first section are those which apply only
to ex parte 170 divorce proceedings. The first of such limitations
would go to insuring such notice to the absent defendant as
would pass muster due-processwise. The second and third would
be directed toward requiring more objectivity than the ipse dixit
of the divorce plaintiff's allegations, and affording the defendant
an opportunity to defeat recognition of the decree if perjury
was used in its procurement. This proviso is inserted because the
opportunity for cross-examination, which in legal contemplation
is ample to expose perjured testimony in a contested action, is
not present in an ex parte proceeding. If it were not present
170. Strictly speaking ex parte actions are only those in which there was
no notice to or appearance by the defendant. In current divorce literature
the term is commonly used in reference to cases wherein the defendant does
not appear or contest the action, but does have that minimum notice which
satisfies the test of procedural due process.
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plaintiffs might fairly easily secure valid divorces based on purely
fictitious testimony as to their twelve months' residence. These
safety precautions referring to ex parte actions might be phrased
as follows:
Ex Parte Proceedings-Recognition of any decree of divorce
in the litigation of which the divorce defendant neither ap-
peared personally, nor was personally served with process,
may be refused in another of the United States if the divorce
defendant proves in such other state that (a) no notice rea-
sonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the
action was given, or (b) no evidence was introduced in the
proceeding to prove any one or more of the facts alleged in
the complaint, or (c) perjured testimony was offered at the
trial thereof.
The final portion of the statute should describe the extent to
which State B may examine into the correctness of the finding
by State A of the jurisdictional facts. It is in this section that
review by State B will be limited to a testing for the objective
factor of twelve months' residence. Confining State B's review
to determining the correctness of State A's finding of this ob-
jective fact should greatly reduce the occurrence of what seemed
to be an inevitable conflict of result when State B tested the
correctness of the finding of domicil by State A. The section
would provide:
Scope of Review-Recognition of a decree of divorce granted
in another state may be refused in any state wherein recog-
nition of the validity thereof is sought, upon proof that the
finding that the divorce plaintiff was resident twelve months
in the divorce-decreeing state was erroneously made. If the
party seeking to defeat recognition of the divorce decree is
unable to prove error in the finding of the twelve months'
residence, then, for the purpose of determining the divorce-
decreeing court's jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage status,
the correctness of the finding of domicil by the divorce-de-
creeing court shall be conclusively presumed.
Finally, we might reflect on the words of Mr. Justice Jackson
as he sounds the warning:
The whole issue of faith and credit as applied to domestic
relations is difficult, and the books of the Court will not be
closed on it for a long time, if ever. [Italics ours.] 171
The proposed statute, although it may not slam shut the books
of the Court, will at least be the first stride down the road to
that now all too distant goal.
171. Jackson, supra note 117, at 14.
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TEXT OF SUGGESTED STATUTE
An Act to Provide for Uniformity in the Recognition of
Divorce Decrees of the Courts of the Several States
(1) General Provisions-Subject to the provisions of sec-
tions two and three hereof, whenever any state has undertaken
through its courts to enter a decree of divorce, such decree must
be recognized in every other state as a valid dissolution of the
marriage status of the plaintiff and defendant in such divorce
action; provided that the record of the court issuing the decree
contains a finding that (a) the divorce is final, and (b) the di-
vorce plaintiff was domiciled in the state whose court issued the
decree, and (c) the divorce plaintiff was resident in such state
for at least twelve months next preceding the filing of the petition
for divorce.
(2) Ex Parte Proceedings-Recognition of any decree of
divorce in the litigation of which the divorce defendant neither
appeared personally, nor was personally served with process,
may be refused in another of the United States if the divorce
defendant proves in such other state that (a) no notice reason-
ably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the action was
given, or (b) no evidence was introduced in the proceeding to
prove any one or more of the facts alleged in the complaint, or(c) perjured testimony was offered at the trial thereof.
(3) Scope of Review-Recognition of a decree of divorce
granted in another state may be refused in any state wherein
recognition of the validity thereof is sought upon proof that the
finding that the divorce plaintiff was resident twelve months in
the div6rce-decreeing state was erroneously made. If the party
seeking to defeat recognition of the divorce decree is unable to
prove error in the finding of the twelve months' residence, then,
for the purpose of determining the divorce-decreeing court'sjurisdiction to dissolve the marriage status, the correctness of
the finding of domicil by the divorce-decreeing court shall be
conclusively presumed.
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